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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, ] 
Plaintiff-Respondent, ] 
vs. ] 
DONALD WAYNE GAMBRELL, ) 
Defendant-Appellant. ] 
i Case No. 900559-CA 
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
The Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals is established 
by 78-2A-3(2)(d), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction following a jury 
trial on the charges of three counts of Negligent Homicide. The 
Defendant was sentenced to serve three (3) consecutive one year 
terms in the Iron County Jail, one year on each count of 
negligent homicide. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The issues presented by this appeal are whether the 
Court, under the facts of this case, has the authority to impose 
consecutive rather than concurrent sentences upon this Defendant, 
and whether the court was without jurisdiction by failure of the 
County Attorney to post a bond upon taking office. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
The statutes which are believed to be determinative in 
this matter are 76-1-401 and 76-1-402, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
as amended. These statutes are reproduced in total as the 
addendum to this brief. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a Judgment, Sentence and 
Commitment from the Fifth Circuit Court of Iron County, Cedar 
City Department, following a jury trial in which the Defendant 
was convicted of three counts of Negligent Homicide. 
COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
The Defendant was tried by a jury and convicted of 
three counts of Negligent Homicide. The Defendant did not return 
to Utah for sentencing until October 16, 1990, and he was 
sentenced to three consecutive terms of one year in the Iron 
County Jail. 
DISPOSITION AT TRIAL COURT 
The Defendant was sentenced to serve three consecutive 
terms of one year in the Iron County Jail with the court 
maintaining jurisdiction to review the sentence after one year. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On August 20, 1989, the Defendant, Donald Wayne 
Gambrell was driving a semi-trailer truck loaded with steel 
mine-framing materials on Highway U-14 east of Cedar City, 
Utah. (T.213) Mr. Gambrell's direction of travel was east to 
west. Traveling west to east up U-14, which is a mountainous, 
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paved, two-lane highway, were Robert C. Griffin, Neoma 
G. Baldwin, and Colette M. Griffin. (T.47) Near milepost 13 of 
the highway, on a downgrade, Mr. Gambrell lost the braking system 
in the truck and it began to accelerate out of 
control. (T.22 0-222) In an attempt to drive the truck across the 
on-coming lane of travel and into a hillside, Mr. Gambrell struck 
the vehicle occupied by Robert C. Griffin, Neoma G. Baldwin, and 
Colette M. Griffin killing all three. (T.225) Mr. Gambrell was 
convicted in a jury trial on December 14, 1989, of three counts 
of negligent homicide. He was sentenced to one year in the Iron 
County Jail on each count, the sentences to run consecutively, 
one to follow the other. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial count does not have authority under the 
Criminal Negligence statute to impose three consecutive sentences 
upon this Defendant in this case. 
The trial court was without jurisdiction to try this 
Defendant because of the failure of the Iron County Attorney to 
post a bond upon taking office. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DEFENDANT'S CONDUCT IN THIS CASE CAN BE PUNISHABLE 
ONLY BY ONE SENTENCE IN THE IRON COUNTY JAIL, NOT THREE 
CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES. 
The court's attention is drawn specifically to 
76-1-402, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, wherein a 
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Defendant may be prosecuted in a single action for all separate 
offenses arising out of a single criminal episode. However, when 
the same act of a Defendant establishes offenses which may be 
punished in different ways, the act can only be punished in one 
of the multiple ways. In the present instance before the court, 
Mr. Gambrell's "act" was not an act at all but rather an omission 
found by the jury to rise to the degree of criminal negligence. 
The jury apparently believed that Mr. Gambrell was criminally 
negligent in driving his heavily laden semi-trailer truck down 
Highway U-14 with brakes that were not properly adjusted. The 
case law presently pertinent to the point raised on appeal is 
most closely found in the case of State v. Mane, 783 P.2d 61 
(Utah Ct.App., 1989). However, this case varies substantially in 
its factual setting. In the Mane case, the Defendant was 
involved in an intentional act of firing a firearm, which act 
harmed two (2) different victims. In upholding consecutive 
rather than concurrent sentences, this court reasoned in the 
Mane case that the Defendant's "act" was voluntary and that 
because of the definition under Utah State Law of a voluntary 
act, the Defendant could be punished with consecutive sentences 
for both the homicide and aggravated assault,, This court has 
cited with approval the case of State v. James, 631 P.2d 854 
(Utah, 1981), wherein the Utah Supreme Court stated, 
"A defendant who commits an act of violence with 
the intent to harm more than one person or by means 
likely to cause harm to more than several persons is 
more culpable than a defendant that harms only one 
person." 
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In the present case, this Defendant, Mr. Gambrell, did not 
perform any act but simply involved himself in a fact setting 
which the jury determined to be criminally negligent. Under 
these circumstances, it would appear that the Defendant's 
criminal negligence can only be punished in one of the multiple 
ways and that he may be incarcerated for only one year. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT WAS WITHOUT JURISDICTION TO TRY THIS 
DEFENDANT BECAUSE OF THE FAILURE OF THE IRON COUNTY ATTORNEY TO 
POST A BOND UPON TAKING OFFICE. 
17-16-11, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, 
requires that the Iron County Attorney execute a bond for 
faithful performance of his office. The actual bond purportedly 
filed by the Iron County Attorney is entitled "Public Employeefs 
Blanket Bond" and is attached to the Defendant's Memorandum of 
Points and Authorities in Support of Motion to Dismiss filed with 
the Circuit Court on February 14, 1990. However, neither the 
bond from Western Surety Company known as a public employee's 
blanket bond nor the representations of the bonding company 
address the fact that Scott M. Burns, the Iron County Attorney, 
had not executed a bond for the faithful performance of his 
office within the time required by statute. 
The undersigned, at the time I served as Iron County 
Attorney from 1979 through 1982, was required to first obtain a 
bond from Western Surety Company and sign the same and deliver 
and file it with the Iron County Clerk prior to taking the oath 
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of office as the Iron County Attorney on January 1, 1979. 
Under the provisions of 52-2-1, Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, as amended, the office of Iron County Attorney is vacant is 
vacant and was vacant sixty (60) days after the beginning of the 
term of Mr. Burns on January 1, 1987. The case which appears to 
be controlling is now ninety-years old, but the case of State 
v. Beddo, 63 P.96 (Utah, 1900), provides that the trial court has 
only jurisdiction to dismiss the matter when the prosecutor is 
not appropriately qualified. 
This Defendant takes the position that because of the 
failure of Mr. Burns to qualify for office under the provisions 
of 52-2-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, which statute 
was upheld and supported in the case of Stcite Ex Rel. Stain 
v. Christensen, 35 P.2d 775, the Iron County Attorney's office 
has no jurisdiction in this matter and the case must be 
dismissed. 
CONCLUSION 
This Defendant specifically requests this court to 
reverse and remand this matter to the Circuit Court with 
instructions to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction or in 
the alternative to rule that the Defendant's sentence be limited 
to one year on the three consecutive sentences for each count 
under the single criminal episode act. 
DATED this o day of January, 1991. 
JAJ4ES L. SHUMATE 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the above and foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT to Mr. Scott 
M. Burns, Iron County Attorney, P.O. Box 428, Cedar City, Utah 
84720, this o day of January, 1991, first class postage 
fully prepaid. 
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MULTIPLE PROSECUTIONS AND DOUBLE 
JEOPARDY 
76-1-401. "Single criminal episode" defined — 
Joinder of offenses and defendants. 
In this part unless the context requires a different 
definition, "single criminal episode" means all con-
duct which is closely related in time and is incident to 
an attempt or an accomplishment of a single criminal 
objective. 
Nothing in this part shall be construed to limit or 
modify the effect of Section 77-21-31 in controlling 
the joinder of offenses and defendants in criminal pro-
ceedings. 1975 
76-1-402. Separate offenses arising out of single 
criminal episode — Included offenses. 
( D A defendant may be prosecuted in a single 
criminal action for all separate offenses arising out of 
a single criminal episode; however, when the same 
act of a defendant under a single criminal episode 
shall establish offenses which may be punished in 
different ways under different provisions of this code, 
the act shall be punishable under only one such provi-
sion; an acquittal or conviction and sentence under 
any such provision bars a prosecution under any 
other such provision. 
(2) Whenever conduct may establish separate of-
fenses under a single criminal episode, unless the 
court otherwise orders to promote justice, a defendant 
shall not be subject to separate trials for multiple 
offenses when: 
(a) The offenses are within the jurisdiction of a 
single court, and 
(b) The offenses are known to the prosecuting 
attorney at the time the defendant is arraigned 
on the first information or indictment. 
(3) A defendant may be convicted of an offense in-
cluded in the offense charged but may not be con-
victed of both the offense charged and the included 
offense. An offense is so included when: 
(a) It is established by proof of the same or less 
than all the facts required to establish the com-
mission of the offense charged; or 
(b) It constitutes an attempt, solicitation, con-
spiracy, or form of preparation to commit the of-
fense charged or an offense otherwise included 
therein: or 
(c) It is specifically designated by a statute as 
a lesser included offense. 
(4) The court shall not be obligated to charge the 
jury with respect to an included offense unless there 
is a rational basis for a verdict acquitting the defen-
dant of the offense charged and convicting him of the 
included offense. 
(5) If the district court on motion after verdict or 
judgment, or an appellate court on appeal or certio-
rari, shall determine that there is insufficient evi-
dence to support a conviction for the offense charged 
but that there is sufficient evidence to support a con-
viction for an included offense and the trier of fact 
necessarily found every fact required for conviction of 
that included offense, the verdict or judgment of con-
viction may be set aside or reversed and a judgment 
of conviction entered for the included offense, without 
necessity of a new trial, if such relief is sought by the 
defendant 1974 
